Book 12 edition notes 601–700

After Bhrigu's discourse to Bharadwaja this question may seem to be a repetition. The commentator explains that it arises from the declaration of Bhishma that Righteousness is a property of the mind, and is, besides, the root of everything. (V 31, sec. 193, ante). Hence the enquiry about Adhyatma as also about the origin of all things.

The word rendering 'perceptions' is Vijnanani. 'Cognitions' would perhaps, be better.

Generally, in Hindu philosophy, particularly of the Vedanta school, a distinction is conceived between the mind, the understanding, and the soul. The mind is the seat or source of all feelings and emotions as also all our perceptions, or those which are called cognitions in the Kantian school, including Comparison which (in the Kantian school) is called the Vernuft or Reason. This last is called the Understanding or buddhi. The soul is regarded as something distinct from both the body and the mind. It is the Being to whom the body and the mind belong. It is represented as inactive, and as the all-seeing witness within the physical frame. It is a portion of the Supreme Soul.

Goodness includes all the higher moral qualities of man. Passion means love, affection, and other emotions that appertain to worldly objects. Darkness means anger, lust, and such other mischievous propensities.

I follow Nilakantha in his grammatical exposition of this verse. The meaning, however, is scarcely clear. The identity of the Understanding or intelligence with the senses and the mind may be allowed so far as the action of the three qualities in leading all of them to worldly attachments is concerned. But what is meant by the identity of the Understanding with all the objects it comprehends? Does Bhishma preach Idealism here? If nothing exists except as it exists in the Understanding, then, of course, with the extinction of the Understanding, all things would come to an end.

Brown and other followers of Reid, whether they understood Reid or not, regarded all the perceptions as only particular modifications of the mind. They denied the objective existence of the world.

The commentator explains this verse thus, although as regards the second line he stretches it a little. If Nilakantha be right, K.P. Singha must be wrong. Generally, however, it is the known incapacity of the ocean to transgress its continents that supplies poets with illustrations. Here, however, possibly, the rarity of the phenomenon, viz., the ocean's transgressing its continents, is used to illustrate the rare fact of the intelligence, succeeding by yoga power, in transcending the attributes of Rajas, Tamas and Sattwa.

on the other hand, directing one's thoughts boldly to it, one should ascertain its cause and dispel that cause, which, as stated here, is Passion.

The first two words of the second line are those of verse 5. See I, Manu.

Kathanchit is explained by Nilakantha as 'due to great ill-luck.'

I do not follow Nilakantha in rendering this verse.

The soul is said to be only a witness or spectator and not an actor. The Rishis understood by the soul the being to whom the mind, the senses, etc., all belong. Could the idea of the inactive and unsinning Soul have arisen from observation of the moral principle of Conscience which discriminates between right and wrong, and acts, therefore, as an impartial judge, or watches everything like an uninterested spectator? European moralists generally attribute two other functions to the Conscience, viz., impelling us to do the right and avoid the wrong, and approving when right is done and wrong avoided. But these functions may easily be attributed to some other principle. At any rate, when the question is one of nomenclature only, the last two functions may be taken away and the word Soul applied to indicate the Conscience as the faculty of discrimination only.

The qualities here referred to are those of Sattwa (goodness), Rajas (passion), and Tamas (darkness). What is meant by this verse is that such a person transcends the qualities instead of the qualities transcending him and his acts.

Nilakantha takes the third line as elliptical and is for supplying te labhante.

I follow the commentator in his exposition of this verse. Anavisandhipurvakam is explained as nishkamam. Ubhayam is prachinamaihikam cha karmam. Apriyam is equivalent to vadham. The substance of priyam, etc., is thus given: Moksham prati tu karmanah karanatwam duranirastam.

Aturam is explained as pierced by lust, wrath, etc. Asuyate is equivalent to dhikkaroti. Janah is explained by the commentator as parikshakah but it would be better to take it as standing for people generally. Tasya is an instance of the genitive for the accusative. Tat refers to nindyam karma, sarvatah means sarvashu yonishu. Janayati Janena dadati. The object of the verse is to show that sinful acts produce fear both here and hereafter.

Loka is in the locative case, the final vowel indicating to the locative having been dropped for sandhi. Niravishan is an adverb, equivalent to samyak-abhinivesam kurvan. Tattadeva means "those and those" i.e., possessions, such as putradaradikam. Kusalan is sarasaravivekanipunan. Ubhayam is explained as karma-mukhin and sadyomuktim. Bhisma here points out the superiority of the latter kind of Emancipation over the former; hence Vedic acts or rites must yield to that yoga which drills the mind and the understanding and enables them to transcend all earthly influences.

The soul-state is the state of purity. One falls away from it in consequence of worldly attachments. One may recover it by yoga which aids one in liberating oneself from those attachments.

The three words used here are vichara, viveka, and vitarka. They are technical terms implying different stages of progress in yoga. The commentator explains them at length.

Everything that man has is the product of either exertion or destiny; of exertion, that is, as put forth in acts, and destiny as dependent on the acts of a past life or the will of the gods or pure chance. Yoga felicity is unattainable through either of these two means.

Sankhya is understood by the commentator as implying Vedanta-vichara.

This verse is a triplet. The commentator explains that Vedanta in the second line means Sankhya. I think, this is said because of the agreement between the Vedanta and the Sankhya in this respect notwithstanding their difference in other respects. The object of the verse is to say that according to the Sankhya, there is no necessity for silent recitation of mantras. Mental meditation, without the utterance of particular words, may lead to Brahma.

Both declare, as the commentator explains, that as long as one does not succeed in beholding one's Soul, one may silently recite the Pranava or the original word Om. When, however, one succeeds in beholding one's Soul, then may one give up such recitation.

There are two paths which one in this world may follow. One is called Pravritti dharma and the other Nrivritti dharma. The first is a course of actions; the second of abstention from actions. The attributes indicated in 10 and 11 belong to the first course or path. They are, therefore, called Pravartaka yajna or Sacrifice having its origin in Pravritti or action.

i.e., he should first cleanse his heart by observing the virtues above enumerated.

Samadhi is that meditation in which the senses having been all withdrawn into the mind, the mind, as explained previously, is made to dwell on Brahma alone.

The end declared by Bhishma in the previous section is the success of yoga, or freedom from decrepitude and death, or death at will, or absorption into Brahma, or independent existence in a beatific condition.

It should be noted that 'hell,' as here used, means the opposite of Emancipation. Reciter may attain to the joys of heaven, but compared to Emancipation, they are hell, there being the obligation of rebirth attached to them.

Even this is a kind of hell, for there is re-birth attached to it.

Aiswvarya or the attributes of godhead are certain extraordinary powers attained by yogins and Reciters. They are the power to become minute or huge in shape, or go whither soever one will, etc. These are likened to hell, because of the obligation of re-birth that attaches to them. Nothing less than Emancipation or the absorption into the Supreme Soul is the end that should be striven for.

In the Bengal texts there is a vicious line beginning with Prajna, etc. The Bombay text omits it, making both 10 and 11 couplets, instead of taking 11 as a triplet.

Na samyuktah is explained by the commentator as aviraktopi hathena tyaktabhogah.

For there no forms exist to become the objects of such functions. All is pure knowledge there, independent of those ordinary operations that help created beings to acquire knowledge.

The six Angas are Siksha, Kalpa, Vyakarana, Nirukta, Chhandas, Jyotish.

i.e., an insight not obtained in the ordinary way but by intuition.

K.P. Singha mistranslates the word sadhaye. It means 'I go', and not 'I will strive etc.' The Burdwan translator is correct.

Work and Abstention from work are the two courses of duty prescribed or followed.

It seems that Vikrita had given away a cow. He had then made a gift to Virupa of the merit he had won by that righteous act.

Picking solitary grains from the crevices in the fields after the crops have been gathered and taken away.

He gave me the merit he won by giving away one cow. I wish to give him in return the merit I have won by giving away two cows.

Verses 107 and 108 are rather obscure. What the king says in 107 seems to be that you two have referred your dispute to me who am a king. I cannot shirk my duty, but am bound to judge fairly between you. I should see that kingly duties should not, so far as I am concerned, become futile. In 108 he says, being a king I should discharge the duties of a king, i.e., I should judge disputes, and give, if need be, but never take. Unfortunately, the situation is such that I am obliged to act as a Brahmana by taking what this particular Brahmana is desirous of offering.

This verse also seems to be very obscure. The king's natural inclination, it seems, prompts him to oblige the Brahmana by accepting his gift. The ordinances about kingly duties restrain him. Hence his condemnation of those duties. In the second line, he seems to say that he is morally bound to accept the gift, and intends to make a gift of his own merits in return. The result of this act, he thinks, will be to make both courses of duty (viz., the Kshatriya, and the Brahmana's) produce the same kind of rewards in the next world.

This is not Emancipation, but merely terminable felicity.

Attains to Emancipation or Absorption into the essence of Brahma.

These are Direct knowledge (through the senses), Revelation, Inference, and Intuition.

The first six are Hunger, Thirst, Grief, Delusion, Disease, and Death. The other sixteen are the five breaths, the ten senses, and the mind.

I think, K.P. Singha misunderstands this verse. Three different ends are spoken of. One is absorption into Brahma; the other's enjoyment of ordinary felicity, which, of course, is terminable, and the last is the enjoyment of that felicity which is due to a freedom from desire and attachments; 126 speaks of this last kind of felicity.

In the second line saraddham is not an indeclinable; or, if it be taken as such, the sense may still remain unaltered. What the monarch does is to call upon the Brahmana to share with the monarch the rewards that the monarch had won.

The sense seems to be that yogins attain to Brahma even here; whereas Reciters attain to him after death.

The fact is, I do not know anything of Him, but still I profess to worship him. This is false behaviour. How shall I be rescued from such falsehood? This is what Vrihaspati says.

The Chhandas are the rules of Prosody as applicable to the Vedic hymns. Jyotish is astronomy. It forms an Anga of the Vedas. Nirukta furnishes rules for interpreting obscure passages of the Vedas, and also gives the meanings of technical or obscure words used therein. Kalpa is the description of religious rites. Siksha is the science of pronunciation as applied to Vedic hymns and mantras.

They who believe that happiness is not eternal and that, therefore, they should not pursue it, withdraw themselves from pious acts which lead to that happiness. They seek Knowledge as the best means for avoiding all that is transitory and changeful. They seek moksha or complete Emancipation which has been described in the previous sections.

The meaning of 'hell' as applied in such passages has been explained before.

This is a highly aphoristic line. I give the sense by expanding the words. By 'acts' here is meant 'sacrifices and other religious observances.' The intention of Vrihaspati is to enforce the propriety of acts, for without acts, the ends of life cannot, he maintains, be secured.

The sense is that one should devote oneself to acts as a sort of preparation. Afterwards one should abandon them for obtaining the higher end. Acts, therefore, have their use, and help one, though mediately, in the acquisition of Brahma.

The mind and acts have created all things. This has been explained in the last verse of section 190 ante. Both are good paths, for by both, good end may be attained, viz., the highest, by drilling the mind, as also (mediately) by acts (as explained in verse 14 above). The fruits of actions must be mentally abandoned if the highest end is to be attained; i.e., acts may be gone through, but their fruits should never be coveted.

Nilakantha explains the grammar of the first line differently. His view is yatha chakshurupah praneta nayako, etc. A better construction would be yatha chaksha pranetah (bhavati) etc.

This verse may be said to furnish the key of the doctrine of karma or acts and why acts are to be avoided by persons desirous of Moksha or Emancipation. Acts have three attributes: for some are Sattwika (good), as sacrifices undertaken for heaven, etc., some are Rajasika (of the quality of Passion), as penances and rites accomplished from desire of superiority and victory; and some are Tamasika (of the quality of Darkness), as those undertaken for injuring others, notably the Atharvan rites of Marana, Uchatana, etc.: this being the case, the Mantras, without acts, cannot be accomplished, are necessarily subject to the same three attributes. The same is the case with rituals prescribed. It follows, therefore, that the mind is the chief cause of the kind of fruits won, i.e., it is the motive that determines the fruits, viz., of what kind it is to be. The enjoyer of the fruit, of course, is the embodied creature.

There can be no doubt that Nilakantha explains this verse correctly. It is really a cruce. The words Naro na samsthanagatah prabhuh syat must be taken as unconnected and independent. Na samsthana gatah is before death. Prabhuh is adhikari (jnanphale being understood). K.P. Singha gives the sense correctly, but the Burdwan translator makes nonsense of the words.

The subject of this verse as explained by the commentator, is to inculcate the truth that the result of all acts accomplished by the body is heaven where one in a physical state (however subtile) enjoys those fruits. If Emancipation is to be sought, it must be attained through the mind.

The sense depends upon the word acts. If acts are accomplished by the mind, their fruits must be enjoyed by the person in a state in which he will have a mind. Emancipation cannot be achieved by either recitation (japa) or Dhyana (meditation), for both these are acts. Perfect liberation from acts is necessary for that great end.

viz., Taste, etc.

Existent, line atom; non-existent, line space; existent-nonexistent, line Maya or illusion.

Aswabhavam is explained by the commentator as Pramatri-twadi vihinam.

i.e., one sees one's own soul.

i.e., which, though one, divides itself into a thousand form like the image of the moon in a quantity of agitated water.

The analogy consists in this: good and evil fruits, though incompatible, dwell together; similarly, knowledge, though not material, resides in the material body. Of course, knowledge is used here in the sense of the mind or the understanding.

It is difficult to understand why the idea of lamps set on trees is introduced here.

The analogy is thus explained. Fire, when fed, bursts into flames. When not fed, it dies out, but is not destroyed, for with new fuel the flames may be brought back. The current of the wind ceases, but does not suffer extinction; for if it did, there would be no current again. The same is the case with the rays of the Sun. They die in the night, to reappear in the morning. The rivers are dried up in summer and refilled during the rains. The body, once dissolved, appears in another form. It will be seen that the weakness of the reasoning is due only to incorrect notions about the objects referred to.

Exists in its own nature, i.e., unaffected by attributes and qualities and accidents.

Some of the Bengal texts read sumahan and subuddhih in the second line. Of course, this is incorrect. The true reading is samanah and sabuddhih, meaning 'with mind and with understanding.' In the Bombay edition occurs a misprint, viz., sumanah for samanah. Nilakantha cites the correct readings.

The Burdwan translator misunderstands the word Linga as used in both 14 and 15. K.P. Singha also wrongly renders that word as it occurs in 15. The commentator rightly explains that Linga has no reference to Linga-sarira or the invisible body composed of the tanmatra of the primal elements, but simply means the gross body. In 14, he says, Lingat sthuladehat, Lingam tadeva dehantaram. In 15, anena Lingena Savibhutena. Adristhah means alakshitah. A little care would have removed such blunders.

The commentator cites the Gita which furnishes a parallel passage, viz., Indriyani paranyahurindriyebhyah param manah, etc.

This verse seems to show that the Rishis had knowledge of spectacles, and probably also, of microscopes. The instrument that shewed minute objects must have been well known, otherwise some mention would have been made of it by name. The commentator calls it upanetra.

By death on sleep.

Yugapat means simultaneous; atulyakalam means differing in point of time in respect of occurrence; kritsnam qualifies indriyartham; Vidwan means Sakshi; and ekah, independent and distinct. What is intended to be said here is that when the soul, in a dream, musters together the occurrences and objects of different times and places, when, in fact, congruity in respect of both time and place does not apply to it, it must be regarded to have an existence that is distinct and independent of the senses and the body.

The object of this is to show that the Soul has only knowledge of the pleasures and pains arising in consequence of Sattwa and Rajas and Tamas and in connection with the three states of the understanding due to the same three attributes. The Soul, however, though knowing them, does not enjoy or suffer them. He is only the silent and inactive Witness of everything.

The object of the simile is to show that as wind is a separate entity although existing with the fire in a piece of wood, so the Soul, though existing with the senses is distinct from them.

The Bengal texts read indriyanam which I adopt. The Bombay edition reads indriyendriyam, meaning the sense of the senses, in the same way as the Srutis declare that is the Prana of Prana, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, etc., Sravanena darsanam tatha kritam is 'apprehended by the ear,' i.e., as rendered above, 'apprehended through the aid of the Srutis.'

The commentator uses the illustration of a tree. Before birth the tree was not; and after destruction, it is not; only in the interim, it is. Its formlessness or nothingness is manifest from these two states, for it has been said that which did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future cannot be regarded as existing in the present. Tadgatah is explained by the commentator as udayastamanagatah or taddarsinah.

Both the vernacular translators render the second line incorrectly. The first line is elliptical, and would be complete by supplying asannam pasyanti. The paraphrase of the second line is Pratyayannam Jneyam Jnanabhisamhitam(prati)ninisante. Jneyam is explained by the commentator as prapancham. Jnanabhisamhitam means that which is known by the name of Knowledge, i.e., Brahma, which has many similar names some of which the commentator quotes such as Satyam (truth), Jananam (knowledge), Anantam (infinite), Vijnanam (true knowledge), Anandam (joy or happiness).

Tamas is another name for Rahu. The first line, therefore, refers to the manner in which an eclipse occurs. There is no absolute necessity, however, for taking it as an allusion to the eclipse. The meaning may be more general. Every day, during the lighted fortnight, the moon gains in appearance, as, indeed, every day, during the dark fortnight, it loses in appearance. It may, therefore, be said that darkness approaches it or leaves it for eating it away or discovering it more and more. The actual process of covering and discovering cannot be noticed. This circumstance may be taken as furnishing the simile. In verse 21, similarly, tamas is capable of a wider meaning. In 22, the word Rahu is used. It should be explained, however, that Rahu is no imaginary monster as the Puranas describe but the descending node of the moon, i.e., a portion of space in and about the lunar orbit.

This is a very difficult verse and the distinction involved in it are difficult to catch. Of course, I follow the commentator in rendering it. What is said here is that in a dream, Vyakta (manifest body) lies inactive, while the Chetanam (the subtile form) walks forth. In the state called Sushupti (deep slumber which is like death) the indriyasamyuktam (the subtile form) is abandoned, and Jnanam (the Understanding), detached from the former, remains. After this manner, abhava (non-existence, i.e., Emancipation) results from destruction of bhavah or existence as subject to its known conditions of dependence on time, manner of apprehension, etc., for Emancipation is absorption into the Supreme Soul which is independent of all the said conditions. The commentator explains that these observations become necessary to show that Emancipation is possible. In the previous section the speaker drew repeated illustrations for showing that the soul, to be manifest, depended on the body. The hearer is, therefore, cautioned against the impression that the soul's dependence on the body is of such an indissoluble kind that it is incapable of detachment from the body, which of course, is necessary for Emancipation or absorption into the Supreme Soul.

Caswasasya is an instance of Bhavapradhananirdesa, i.e., of a reference to the principal attribute connected by it.

Indriaih rupyante or nirupyante, hence Indriyarupani.

The objects to be abandoned are those which the senses apprehend and those which belong to primordial matter. Those last, as distinguished from the former, are, of course, all the linga or subtile forms or existents which are made up of the tanmatras of the grosser elements.

Or, regains his real nature.

I adopt the Bombay reading aptavan instead of the Bengal reading atmavit. Pravrittam Dharmam, as explained previously, is that Dharma or practice in which there is pravritti and not nivritti or abstention.

The sense is this: by abstaining from the objects of the senses one may conquer one's desire for them. But one does not succeed by that method alone in totally freeing oneself from the very principle of desire. It is not till one succeeds in beholding one's soul that one's principle of desire itself becomes suppressed.

The separate existence of an objective world is denied in the first clause here. All objects of the senses are said here to have only a subjective existence; hence the possibility of their being withdrawn into the mind. The latest definition of matter, in European philosophy, is that it is a permanent possibility of sensations.

Te is explained by the commentator as Brahmabhigatah. K.P. Singha wrongly renders the last foot of the second line. The Burdwan version is correct.

Te in the first line is equal to tava.

I follow the commentator in so far as he is intelligible. It is evident that the words Jnanam and Jneyam are used in the original not consistently throughout.

The meaning seems to be this: ordinary men regard all external objects as possessing an independent existence, and their attributes also as things different from the substances which own them. The first step to attain to is the conviction that attributes and substances are the same, or that the attributes are the substances. This accords with the European Idealism. The next stage, of course, is to annihilate the attributes themselves by contemplation. The result of this is the attainment of Brahma.

Antaratmanudarsini is explained by the commentator as "that which has the Antaratman for its anudarsin or witness." The Burdwan translator is incorrect in rendering the second line.

The first 'knowledge' refers to the perception of the true connection between the Soul and the not-Soul. 'Fruits' mean the physical forms that are gained in new births. The destruction of the understanding takes place when the senses and the mind are withdrawn into it all of them, united together, are directed towards the Soul. Jneyapratishthitam Jnanam means, of course, knowledge of Brahma.

The commentator explains that sorrow arises from the relation of the knower and the known. All things that depend upon that relation are transitory. They can form no part of what is eternal and what transcends that relation.

I take the obvious meaning, instead of the learned explanation offered by Nilakantha.

The very Yogins, if led away by the desire of acquiring extraordinary powers and the beatitude of the highest heaven do not behold the Supreme.

Gunam, literally, attributes; hence objects possessed of attributes.